Paradox of Counterterrorism The Nigerian Military as Boko Haram-ISWAP-ISIS Partnership’s Most Hunted ‘Hard Targets’

Abstract

This study examines Boko Haram-ISWAP-ISIS’ affiliation and the travails of the Nigerian military in the counterterrorism campaign between 2011 and 2021. It relies on qualitative and documentary methods of data collection as well as content analysis. The study develops the concepts of ‘convergence of security threat’ and ‘less convergence of security support’ to explain how Boko Haram-ISWAP-ISIS partnership is implicated in scaling up ISWAP’s tactical capability in carrying out more successful deadly attacks against the hardest targets – Nigerian military forces, army bases and facilities, killing scores of military personnel and carting away important fighting equipment with less push back. It further argues that while Boko Haram-ISWAP-ISIS strategic cooperation depicts considerable inflows of financial, tactical and force training supports, leading to a more formidable and battle-ready ISWAP; the Nigerian military has had marginal and stunted regional and international counterterrorism supports with less strategic capability to withstand or repel the costly terrorist offensives. This spells the need for the Nigerian military to invest heavily in rallying/building/leveraging cooperative regional and international counterterrorism supports in the fight against terror.